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This paper investigates the impact of investment banks’ political contributions on 
their underwriting business with local government officials. Using an original data set on 
municipal underwriting banks political contributions from 1994 to 2013, I find that 
political contributions are strongly associated with the likelihood that a contributing bank 
is hired, the bank’s market share, and the bond issuance cost. Specifically, contributing 
underwriters receive 19.6% more business than non-contributing banks. Bonds 
underwritten by contributing banks incur 4% higher fees compared with their non- 
contributing peers. A contribution of $1,000 is associated with $1,270 higher total 
compensation for a contributing underwriter. These results continue to hold when 
controlling for underwriters characteristics and local economic factors. The evidence 
suggests that political connections still play a valuable role in the municipal bond market 
after the adoption of Rule G-37.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
There has been a growing interest in studying the relationship between political 
connections and firm value. Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010) find that 
connections with political candidates are positively associated with firms’ abnormal 
returns. Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2008) document a positive abnormal stock return 
following the announcement of the nomination of a connected board member. While 
prior research concentrates on the efficacy of political connections, the specific 
mechanism of how firm value is affected has not been well explored. This paper 
investigates the possible channels through which political donations affect the value of 
underwriting banks. It addresses the fundamental question: do political contributing firms 
enjoy preferential access to government contracts? 
There are several motives for the contributing behavior. One hypothesis posits 
that political donations represent corporate investments (Snyder 1990). As Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993) point out, firms make donations to accommodate politicians’ personal 
interest and expect favorable treatments as returns. Baron (1989) models political 
donations as a means to gain access to promising services. In his model, donors 
contribute in order to obtain access to elected officials and such access includes seeking 
government services. Political connections can have a considerable impact on the value 
of connected firms. Fisman (2001) constructs a credible index of political connections 
and measures the extent to which firms rely on political connections for their 
profitability. He finds that the value of politically dependent firms is more sensitive to 
political risk than that of politically independent firms.  
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An alternative hypothesis states that political donations may serve as an 
information-sharing channel between firms and governments. In Austen-Smith’s (1995) 
model, donors seek a chance to tell their “story” to uninformed legislators. A firm may 
engage in politics to provide officials with valuable information about the firm’s products 
and services (Bennedsen and Feldmann 2002; Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi 2014). 
This implies that the public is better off from such political connection because it lowers 
government’s search cost and improves the decision-making process.  
The third hypothesis believes that political connections have no effects on 
government contract decisions. Coate (2004) suggests that donors are motivated to help 
their candidates win the election. Instead of buying policy favors, contributors help 
advertise the candidate’s ideology and enhance the electoral prospects. In addition, public 
oversight and scrutiny would monitor government policies and result in an independent 
relationship between political connections and government contract allocations (Fama 
1980).  
If political connections have value, it should be most prevalent in industries where 
firms rely on government contracts and public policies. The municipal debt market, a 
market with $2.4 trillion1 negotiated sales and $16 billion issue fees from 1994 to 2013, 
provides a perfect laboratory to examine how such political connection plays a role in 
government contract distributions. During this period, about 87% of the municipal bonds 
are placed through negotiated deals where issuer officials choose banks for the bond 
underwriting business. Among the largest 100 investment banks in the sample, 37% of 
the banks make political donations to local political parties every year. On average, 
municipal bonds from 53% of the U.S. states (including D.C.) are sold by contributing 
                                                             
1 The total negotiated deals amount to 2,421.26 billion reported in Panel A of Table 1. 
3 
 
banks each year. Whether political connections play a role in the choice of the lead 
underwriter in a negotiated deal is thus an important question to address.  
In the municipal bond market, underwriting banks are traditionally allowed to 
make political contributions to government officials. It has been contended that such 
contributions may influence the issuer official’s choice of underwriters. On April 6, 1994, 
the SEC adopted Rule G-372, the first rule intended to end this pay-to-play practice. The 
enacted rule not only requires quarterly disclosure on political donations but also 
regulates the amount of donations made to government officials. For example, 
contributions made directly to issuer officials will result in a business prohibition 
between the contributing bank and the issuer for the next two years unless the contributor 
is an entitled voter and the contribution is under $250. In an unreported test, I find direct 
contributions to campaign candidates have no significant effect on an underwriter’s bond 
business. This suggests the direct donation channel has been effectively blocked by the 
introduction of Rule G-37. Contributions to campaign candidates can no longer serve as a 
means to gain government bond contracts. 
Although the regulation imposes severe restrictions on donations, contributors 
still find their way to circumvent the rule. For instance, if a donor makes contributions to 
a local political party, the donation will not trigger the two-year business ban as long as 
the party does not state that the money will be given to a particular candidate. This is a 
grey area that allows an underwriter to circumvent the regulation by donating money 
through the official’s political party. Although the SEC requires underwriters to disclose 
                                                             
2 The rule is proposed by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) on January 14, 1994 and 
approved by the SEC on April 6, 1994. 
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all donations made to political parties, no further actions have been adopted to close this 
“loophole”. 
In this paper, I examine whether underwriters use donations to parties as a means 
to continue the pay-to-play practice after the adoption of Rule G-37. Using donations to 
political parties as the proxy for political connections between underwriters and issuers3, 
I analyze the connection’s impact on an issuer’s choice of underwriters. The finding 
shows political connections are positively associated with the likelihood that an 
underwriting bank is hired in a negotiated deal. Specifically, political contributing banks 
obtain 19.6% more business than banks that do not make contributions. The result holds 
when controlling for underwriter’s relationship with the issuer, underwriter’s location, 
and local economy factors. This finding lends supports to the political-investment 
hypothesis that views donation as a corporate investment. 
Including the past business relation between an underwriter and an issuer in the 
regression, I find political influence is more notable for donations to issuers with pre-
existing business history with the investment bank. This is inconsistent with the 
information-providing hypothesis that suggests donations are more valuable to unrelated 
issuers. Overall, the findings lend weight to the political-investment view that suggests 
underwriting banks may use political donations as a corporate investment to obtain access 
to government contracts.  
Using gross spread as the measure of bond issuance cost4, I find that bonds sold 
by contributing banks incur 4% more fees than non-contributing banks5. This continues 
                                                             
3 The form includes all required donation information by underwriting banks. See Appendix A. 
4 Butler, Fauver, and Mortal (2009) believe that underwriting cost is an important indicator for the issuer’s 
political integrity. 
5 On average, every $1,000 donation is associated with $1,390 higher underwriting fees. 
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to hold when controlling for issuer credit ratings, bond structures, and underwriter fixed 
effects. This economic distortion suggests that quid pro quo may still exist in the 
municipal bond market where official issuers pay extra fees as an exchange for banks’ 
donations (Butler, Fauver, and Mortal 2009). This finding contradicts the information-
sharing hypothesis that considers political donation an information-providing vehicle. 
That is, a more informed decision should result in a lead underwriter choice based on the 
bank’s qualification and issuance costs.  
In addition to the baseline tests, I analyze the characteristics of the donating 
underwriters. The finding shows investment banks that have an office in the local area are 
more likely to make donations to local officials. This is consistent with Butler’s (2008) 
finding that local investment banks may have “soft” information about local issuers and 
politics. The analysis also shows that investment banks are more likely to donate money 
to issuers that have greater prospective business opportunities. This supports the political-
investment motive that believes underwriters use contributions as a means to connect 
with bond issuers and obtain more underwriting business. Publicly traded banks and 
banks with good reputations6 seem less likely to make political donations. This is 
consistent with Duchin and Sosyura’s (2012) finding that firms with strong performance 
and good reputations tend to be more politically independent because they are less likely 
to rely on politically induced contracts.  
Using close campaign election results in a regression discontinuity design, I study 
the differential impact on underwriting business between banks supporting elected 
candidates and banks supporting unelected candidates. I find that only donating money to 
a campaign winner is positively associated with an increase in a bank’s underwriting 
                                                             
6 A bank’s nationwide market share is used to proxy for reputation. 
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business. The result lends further support to the value of political influence on the 
underwriter selection process in the municipal bond market.  
To overcome the omitted variable bias, I use the number of state-level corruption 
convictions as an instrumental variable (IV) in a two-stage least square (2SLS) analysis. I 
find that corruption convictions are positively correlated with the likelihood of political 
donations. This suggests that political integrity plays a crucial role in the lead underwriter 
selection process (Butler, Fauver, and Mortal 2009). Moreover, the relation between an 
underwriter’s market share and the predicted political donations stays positive and 
significant in the second stage regression. In a difference-in-differences test, I compare 
the effect of political connections on negotiated deals and competitive deals. If donations 
and the amount of business were co-determined by unobserved factors, it would likely 
affect both negotiated and competitive issues. The finding shows political donations are 
only associated with an increase in contributing banks’ negotiated sales.  
This study makes several contributions to the extant literature. First, while prior 
studies focus on the relationship between political connections and firm value (Fisman 
2001; Faccio 2006; Akey 2015), I document a channel through which political donations 
are directly associated with underwriting banks revenues. Second, I analyze the 
characteristics of political donating banks and bond issuers. The finding sheds new light 
on the political relation between financial intermediaries and local governments. Last, 
while donations to individual campaign candidates are restricted to a great extent after the 
introduction of Rule G-37, I find that donations to political parties still have a material 
influence in the municipal bond market. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
This paper is part of a number of studies pioneered by Shleifer and Vishny (1993) 
that study the dynamics of politics and firms (Fisman 2001; Faccio 2006; Julio and Yook 
2012). Since political influence is hard to observe directly, many recent papers 
concentrate on the effect of political connections on firm market value. For example, 
Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010) find that relations with political candidates are 
associated with positive abnormal returns. Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2008) analyze the 
stock-price performance of politically connected firms and find a positive abnormal stock 
return following the announcement of the nomination of a connected board member. 
While these findings show that political connections have an impact on firm value, little 
is known about the specific channel that firms benefit from such political activities. This 
paper fills the gap by focusing on one of the mechanisms through which underwriting 
banks receive favorable treatment on government bond business.  
Brown (2016) examines the support effect and the influence effect of underwriter 
campaign donations. According to the support effect, a contributing underwriter should 
exert greater effort to help issuers save bond issuance cost.  On the other hand, a 
contributing bank should influence elected officials to tolerate more expensive issuance 
costs if the contribution is driven by the influence effect. Using relative contribution 
amount as the measure of political influence, he finds that donation amount is positively 
related with the degree of municipal bond underpricing. Using the geographic distance 
between the governor’s birthplace and the average location of contributing underwriters, 
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he documents a positive relationship between the political support and the extent of 
municipal bond underpricing.  
I provide new evidence on the outcome of political connections by examining an 
important decision the issuer is facing, whether contributing banks are more likely to be 
hired for a negotiated issue. This is a crucial aspect of political influence, because such 
relation allows contributor to take contracts away from otherwise qualified banks in the 
government bond market. Given that over 87% of the bond issues during 1994-2013 are 
placed through negotiated sales, whether political connections play a role in the choice of 
the lead underwriter is a critical question to address especially after the introduction of 
Rule G-37. 
Butler, Fauver, and Mortal (2009) find that corruption and political connections 
have impact on municipal bond sales. They focus on the relationship between political 
integrity and credit risk and find that low corruption is associated with better bond 
ratings. They document that the market prices corruption into bond yields but they find 
no evidence that underwriters receive higher fees in highly corrupt states. Butler, Fauver, 
and Mortal (2009) show that negotiated deals issued during the pay-to-play period 
charged 12-14 basis points higher fees at the aggregate level. Using detailed donation 
data, I document that contributing underwriters are paid higher fees than non-contributing 
banks. This finding suggests that political connection still plays an important role in the 
municipal market after the introduction of Rule G-37.  
Butler (2008) suggests that local investment banks have more “soft” information 
on issuers than non-local banks because they have access to firsthand knowledge on local 
economy. These banks can use their local networks to connect with key officials at the 
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issuing body. He shows that such advantage enables local investment banks to be more 
competitive for bond issues and that local dealers charge lower underwriting fees 
compared with national banks. He also discusses that local underwriters may have 
political connections that enable them to win underwriting contracts and capture 
economic rents. My study provides evidence to this hypothesis and shows local 
underwriting banks are more likely to establish political connections with municipal 
officials. This political relation allows them to obtain more business. 
Akey (2015) uses a regression discontinuity design in a sample of close 
congressional elections and compares firms connected with winning candidates and firms 
with losing candidates. He finds that connections to politicians are valuable to firms and 
such political networks have impact on firm sales.  He suggests that indirect connections 
have a more significant effect than direct connections, because influential politicians are 
able to exert influence over their colleagues through an internal circle for political party 
resources that firms cannot access. Following Akey’s (2015) argument on indirect 
donations, I choose donations made to political parties as my proxy for political 
connections. In an unreported analysis, I find direct donations made to campaign 
candidates have no significant impact on a contributing bank’s bond business. 
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CHAPTER III  
MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET AND RULE G-37 
In the municipal debt market, bonds can be sold in one of three ways: negotiated 
sale, competitive sale, or private placement. Most of the issuers choose either negotiated 
method of competitive method to place their issues7. In a competitive sale, the issuer 
solicits bids from underwriting banks and chooses the best bidder as the underwriter. In 
this method, the issuer determines the essential characteristics of the issue. A financial 
advisor and bond counsel are often hired to assist the issuer in a competitive sale. In a 
negotiated deal, a lead underwriter is selected as the senior manager by the issuer before 
the bond terms are determined. This selected underwriter takes the lead role in structuring 
the bond and managing the syndicate. Instead of picking the lowest interest rate as in a 
competitive sale, a negotiated deal allows issuer to choose the underwriting bank. This 
lead underwriter and the issuer would have meetings and discussions during the pricing 
process. Due to the nature of the negotiated sale, the lead underwriter selection decision 
provides an appealing setting to study the influence of political connections. Therefore, 
this paper focuses on the lead underwriter choice in negotiated deals.  
Underwriters have traditionally been permitted to make political donations to 
government officials. The practice is known as pay-to-play. In a typical pay-to-play 
system, underwriters use contributions as a means of political connections and obtain 
underwriting business from their connected issuer officials as a quid pro quo. Since the 
political contributions have been alleged to influence the official’s choice of underwriters 
                                                             
7 About 97% of all the issues during 1994-2013 are underwritten through either negotiated or competitive 
methods.  
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for bond business, the SEC adopts Rule G-378 to end this practice in 1994. According to 
the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), the purpose of Rule G-37 
(effective on April 25, 1994) is to “prevent fraudulent acts, protect investors, and 
maintain the integrity” in the municipal market. In addition to the donation disclosure 
requirement, the rule prohibits contributing banks from doing municipal business with the 
involved government for two years if the contribution exceeds $2509. To a great extent, 
the rule restricts underwriters from making direct political donations to campaign 
candidates. However, underwriters can still make contributions to local political parties 
as indirect donations to issuer officials. Industry practitioners are also aware of these 
different channels of donations (Carney and Hoffman 2016). 
Donations to the campaign of Donald Trump became an issue for Goldman 
because of vice presidential candidate Mike Pence, who is governor of Indiana… The 
new policy, though, doesn’t affect donations by Goldman partners and other 
employees to groups such as the Republican National Committee, an option that 
remains open and that has been communicated informally within the bank, according 
to a person familiar with the matter. 
According to Rule G-37, the pay-to-play ban does not prohibit donations made to 
local political parties as long as those local political parties do not state that the money 
will be given to a specific a campaign candidate. Due to the different standards for 
donations to campaign candidates and political parties, underwriting banks can still 
donate money to issuer officials through the channel of local parties. If banks use this 
channel to connect with local officials for the purpose of gaining future business, 
                                                             
8 Please see details of Rule G-37 in Appendix E. 
9 Please see a violation case in Appendix F. 
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disclosed party donations would be a good source to investigate such political ties 
between banks and issuers. I choose the unlimited donations to political parties rather 
than the limited donations to individual candidate as the primary measure to proxy the 
political connection between an investment bank and a government official. 
This measure has several advantages. First, since Rule G-37 largely restricts 
direct political contributions to campaign candidates, there is demand for alternative 
channels that allow underwriters to continue exerting political influence to obtain bond 
business. Since donations to political parties can serve the same purpose without 
breaching the pay-to-play rule, such indirect donations may become a substitute for 
underwriters to politically connect with bond issuers. Second, donations to political 
parties may help underwriters build connections with government officials more 
effectively because insiders within a political party are able to utilize the donation money 
more efficiently than underwriting banks. Akey (2015) shows that indirect connections 
are more valuable to donors than direct connections. He suggests that influential 
politicians can exert influence over their junior colleagues through an internal market for 
political party resource that firms cannot access. That is, political parties have better 
information and knowledge about a campaign candidate than investment banks. Third, 
searching and finding a good candidate can be costly for an outsider without professional 
knowledge and information. Choosing a wrong candidate would not just reduce the 
donation efficacy but also increase the bank’s cost of acquiring underwriting business.  
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CHAPTER IV  
SAMPLE SELECTION AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
Data Source 
I collect political contributions made by the largest 100 investment banks during 
1994 - 2013 from the MSRB website10. Using the total underwriting amount as the size of 
underwriting banks, the largest 100 underwriters cover about 92% of the new issues over 
the sample period. In accordance with Rule G-37, all municipal bond underwriters are 
required to report their donations to political parties and campaign candidates on Form G-
3711 every quarter. The report includes State Name, County Name, or City Name for each 
political party (committee) or campaign candidate. It also includes contributor’s 
information such as Bank Name, Bank Controlled PAC, Municipal Finance Professional, 
or non-MFP executive officers. In an unreported table, I find that 54% of party 
contributions are made by municipal finance professionals, 22% are from underwriting 
firms, 15% are from executive officers, 7% are from underwriter affiliated PACs, 2% are 
from other contributors. Table 1 summarizes the annual municipal bond issuance, 
political donation amount and the number of connected states, contributing underwriters 
and contribution-related bond issues over the sample period. On average, 53% of the U.S. 
states (including D.C.) are involved with political donations made by municipal 
underwriters every year. Among the largest 100 investment banks, 37% of them make 
political donations to local political parties during 1994-2013. Nearly 10% of bond issues 
are associated with political donations each year. I also report the statistics for top issuers, 
connected political parties, underwriting banks and donating banks in Appendix B. 
                                                             
10 http://emma.msrb.org/MarketActivity/PoliticalContributions.aspx 
11 See an example of Form G-37 in Appendix A. 
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Table 1  
 Municipal Bond Market and Political Contributions (1994-2013) 
Year 
Bond 
Issue 
(BN $) 
Total 
Underwriting 
Fees (MLN) 
Political Donation No. 
Connected 
States 
Total 
No. 
States 
No. 
Connected 
Underwriters 
Total No. 
Underwriters 
No. 
Connected 
Issues 
Total No. 
Issues Mean ($) Total ($) 
1994  64.75  440.52 1,572.29 143,078.34 15 51 12 95 27 682 
1995  64.99  387.26 1,466.11 211,119.99 20 51 27 95 54 592 
1996  73.20  372.12 1,268.86 244,890.50 32 51 37 96 88 666 
1997  84.97  393.52 1,982.35 229,952.50 33 51 42 97 86 742 
1998  114.35  581.54 2,327.85 272,357.92 33 51 46 97 163 986 
1999  94.68  587.98 2,653.80 283,956.50 35 51 46 96 154 1,070 
2000  90.93  460.92 3,429.03 408,055.00 35 51 49 95 157 830 
2001  118.20  646.50 2,768.78 224,270.86 32 51 47 94 138 874 
2002  144.74  559.14 4,166.53 545,815.00 31 51 44 91 159 936 
2003  142.35  584.90 3,296.03 319,715.00 34 51 42 91 151 918 
2004  142.32  695.12 3,912.28 352,105.57 33 51 38 90 128 1,012 
2005  163.75  781.80 2,863.10 120,250.00 31 51 29 87 101 1,153 
2006  140.43  789.77 4,010.59 164,434.09 31 51 28 85 123 1,222 
2007  148.12  884.76 2,895.14 101,330.00 30 51 27 83 99 1,313 
2008  175.56  878.13 4,874.72 219,362.54 25 51 25 77 78 1,365 
2009  165.49  1,404.36 1,299.17 113,027.94 19 50 19 74 53 1,115 
2010  156.01  1,482.06 5,232.87 225,013.52 20 51 18 70 51 1,199 
2011  102.64  776.28 950.00 12,350.00 20 51 17 67 41 876 
2012  131.76  919.52 5,336.76 181,450.00 18 51 17 66 40 1,031 
2013  102.04  635.49 412.35 7,010.00 18 51 17 66 24 896 
Table 1 presents the annual summary of local issue amount for negotiated deals, underwriting cost, political donations to local political parties, and politically 
connected states, underwriters, and bond issues. Bond issue amount is in billion dollars. Mean is the average donation amount for each year. Total is the 
summation of all donations for each year. The number of connected states, connected underwriters and connected issues is the number of states, underwriters 
and issues that are involved in political connections. The total number of states, underwriters and issues is the total number of states, underwriters and issues in 
the sample. 
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Municipal bond data used in this paper is from the Mergent Database. It includes 
bond issuance and underwriter information. For each bond issue, the Mergent Database 
provides bond CUSIP, dated date, underwriter names, issue size, credit rating, maturity 
date, coupon, and credit enhancement information. Bond gross spreads are collected from 
SDC Platinum. Bond feature variables from different sources are merged by bond 
CUSIP’s. There are two main offering mechanisms12 for a municipal bond issuance: 
competitive sale and negotiated sale. In a competitive sale, the issuer solicits bids from 
underwriting banks that want to underwrite and distribute the bonds. The bank that bids 
the best price will be hired as the underwriter for the bond issue. In the case of a 
negotiated sale, a lead underwriter is selected in advance. The issuer and the lead 
underwriter will engage in discussions regarding the offering terms and underwriting 
compensations. In this paper, I only include negotiated deals in the main empirical tests. 
In addition, competitive sales are exempt from the municipal business prohibitions by 
Rule G-37. It implies that the competitive bidding system is not likely to be affected by 
political contributions. Brown (2016) finds that issuance cost such as gross spread and 
bond underpricing in competitive deals are not affected by political connections. 
For each negotiated sale, I use the lead underwriter as the managing bank that is 
taking the main responsibility for a bond pricing and placement. I collect the office 
location information from investment banks’ websites and Bloomberg13. The state and 
local economy data is collected from U.S. Bureau Economics of Analysis (BEA). I include 
                                                             
12 There is an uncommon sale method called private placement. It is a method of sale by which the issuer 
sells bonds directly to a limited number of sophisticated investors without a public offering. Only 3% of all 
bond issues are conducted through private placement over the sample period. 
13 I follow the definition for local office in Butler (2008). If the investment bank has an office in the 
issuer’s state, the underwriter is considered a local underwriter in that issue. The data only includes the 
most updated location information by the end of July 2015. 
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state, state authority, county, and city issuers in the sample because they are the main 
issuers in the municipal debt market. Compared with other issuers such as Universities, 
Education boards or Local agencies, these administration offices are more directly related 
to the study on political campaigns and donations. To filter out municipal entities that 
rarely issue any bonds, I remove local issuers with total offering amount less than $1 
billion over 1994-2013 for county and city issuers. The final sample includes 50 states, 
D.C., 133 counties and 172 cities.  
Variables and Empirical Design 
I use donation dummy in the recent five years14 as a proxy for political connection 
between an investment bank and a bond issuer. State names, county names, and city 
names are used as identifications for bond issuers and local parties that receive donations 
from underwriting banks. For instance, New York City as a city issuer is merged with 
donations made to NYC’s Republican/Democrat Party. I match all states, counties, and 
cities with the 100 underwriters for each year. Each observation consists of a state, 
county, or city matched with an underwriter in a given year. Table 2 reports the summary 
statistics for the sample data from 1994 to 2013. Columns 2-6 include 1,353 underwriter-
local-year observations with donations to political parties in the most recent 5 years. 
Columns 7-11 include 162,777 underwriter-local-year observations with no political 
donations in the recent 5 years. 
 
 
 
                                                             
14 The recent five years include the present year and the past four years. 
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Table 2 
  Summary Statistics for Bond Issues 
Variable 
With Donations Without Donations 
N Mean Std. Min Max N Mean Std. Min Max 
Hire - Negotiated 1,353 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 162,777 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Market Share - Negotiated. 1,353 0.94 1.24 0.00 4.62 162,777 0.12 0.59 0.00 4.62 
Market Share Growth - Negotiated 1,353 90.43 119.06 -69.31 461.51 162,777 13.29 59.65 -69.31 461.51 
Dealer-Issuer History (Past10) 1,353 0.79 0.40 0.00 1.00 162,777 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Local Office Dummy 1,353 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 162,777 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Lagged Dealer Share (Log) 1,353 0.90 0.84 0.00 2.87 162,777 0.48 0.64 0.00 2.87 
Lagged Local Share (Log) 1,353 0.67 0.48 0.00 1.80 162,777 0.28 0.30 0.00 1.80 
Lagged Dealer-Local Share (Log) 1,353 0.89 1.11 0.00 3.87 162,777 0.10 0.47 0.00 4.60 
Public Company 1,353 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 162,777 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Dealer Age (Log) 1,353 4.01 0.88 0.69 5.31 162,777 3.73 0.93 0.00 5.37 
State GDP (Log) 1,353 12.63 0.97 9.67 14.61 162,777 12.33 1.10 9.52 14.61 
Local Employment (Log) 1,353 15.16 0.96 12.81 16.88 162,777 13.93 1.12 11.41 16.88 
Local Income (Log) 1,353 10.40 0.23 9.80 11.18 162,777 10.39 0.27 9.72 11.18 
Local Population (Log) 1,353 15.70 1.00 13.22 17.46 162,777 14.41 1.18 11.79 17.46 
Local Establishment (Log) 1,353 12.13 0.98 9.43 14.14 162,777 10.86 1.16 7.89 14.14 
State Interest Tax 1,353 4.42 2.09 0.00 10.47 162,777 4.36 2.53 0.00 11.98 
Tax Outside State 1,353 0.87 0.33 0.00 1.00 162,777 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Hire - Competitive 1,353 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 162,777 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Market Share - Competitive 1,353 0.44 1.08 0.00 4.62 162,777 0.08 0.51 0.00 4.62 
Market Share Growth - Competitive 1,353 46.67 110.38 -69.31 461.51 162,777 8.95 55.70 -69.31 461.51 
Time Trend 1,353 9.16 4.80 1.00 20.00 162,777 9.78 5.61 1.00 20.00 
This table presents the summary statistics for the group of observations with no donations and observations with political donations to local parties in the most 
recent five years [t-4, t]. Each local area and an investment bank in a year identify an observation. Columns 2-6 include observations with no political donations 
in the recent five years. Columns 7-11 include observations with donations to local parties in the recent five years. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 
D. 
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To test the political connection’s impact on underwriter selections, I use a 
dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the underwriter is hired and 0 otherwise as the 
dependent variable (Hire). To examine the impact of donations on an underwriter’s 
market share, I use the underwriter’s market share in an issuer’s administrative division 
as the dependent variable. For each year, I calculate the total underwriting amount for an 
underwriter in an issuer’s administrative division and divide it by the total offering 
amount of the issuer as the market share. As in Equation (1), each underwriter u has a 
market share in the issuer’s administrative division i during a given year t. 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑢,𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑢,𝑖,𝑡
∑ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡
                                (1) 
The logged market share variable used in empirical tests is computed as in 
Equation (2).  
𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑢,𝑖,𝑡) = log(1 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑢,𝑖,𝑡)              (2) 
To test whether a contributing underwriter experiences a relative change in the 
market share, I take the first different of the logged underwriter’s market share to 
calculate the share growth for each underwriter. 
 𝐿𝑛(𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑢,𝑖,𝑡) = 100 × [log(1 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑢,𝑖,𝑡) 
                                              − log(1 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑢,𝑖,𝑡−1)]                           (3) 
To measure political connections, I use a dummy variable that equals 1 if the lead 
underwriter makes payments to local political parties in the most recent 5 years. 
Donations made to state-level, county-level, and city-level political parties are matched 
with state-level, county-level, and city-level political divisions and their local issuers. For 
example, Goldman Sachs is considered politically connected with New York City in year 
t, if Goldman Sachs makes donations to New York City Republican/Democrat Party in 
19 
 
the recent five years. As Equation (4) shows, a donation made by underwriter u to state, 
county, or city i in year t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if underwriter u makes 
contributions to the political party in issuer i’s administrative division from year t-4 to 
year t. 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑢,𝑖,𝑡 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝑑𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑢,𝑖
𝑡
𝑡−4 > 0
0, 𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝑑𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑢,𝑖
𝑡
𝑡−4 = 0 
      (4) 
Empirical Test Results 
Table 3 presents the Probit and OLS results for the impact of political donations 
on issuer’s underwriter choice. I use a Probit model to test the impact of donations on an 
issuer’s underwriter choice.  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑢,𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼𝑢,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑢,𝑖,𝑡  
                                                               + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑢,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑢,𝑖,𝑡                        (5) 
As is shown in equation (5), the dependent variable is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if underwriter u is hired as the lead underwriter by issuer i in year t. It equals 0 
otherwise. 
Table 3  
Political Connection and Underwriter Selection 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Political Donation Dummy 0.578*** 0.247* 0.159*** 0.004 14.237*** 0.642 
 
(8.497) (1.705) (4.907) (0.170) (4.742) (0.291) 
Dealer-Issuer History 
(Past10) 
0.961*** 0.955*** 0.139*** 0.137*** 12.558*** 12.374*** 
(39.724) (39.696) (15.659) (15.475) (14.970) (14.793) 
Donation with History 
(Past10)  
0.374** 
 
0.196*** 
 
17.098*** 
 
(2.464) 
 
(5.033) 
 
(4.701) 
Local Office 0.451*** 0.451*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 4.328*** 4.339*** 
 
(14.685) (14.740) (4.734) (4.743) (6.336) (6.355) 
Lagged Dealer Share (Log) 0.636*** 0.636*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 12.595*** 12.629*** 
 
(19.502) (19.483) (13.188) (13.244) (13.578) (13.640) 
Lagged Local Share (Log) 0.883*** 0.884*** 0.025** 0.025** 2.555** 2.548** 
 
(8.518) (8.526) (2.123) (2.123) (2.468) (2.475) 
Lagged Dealer-Local Share 0.600*** 0.599*** 0.657*** 0.656*** 62.734*** 62.634*** 
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(Log) (24.041) (24.020) (30.752) (30.602) (32.022) (31.857) 
Public Dummy 0.332** 0.339** 0.205*** 0.206*** 23.297*** 23.441*** 
 
(1.964) (2.017) (8.789) (8.809) (9.055) (9.100) 
Dealer Age (Log) 0.037 0.033 -0.008 -0.009* -1.917*** -2.005*** 
 
(0.769) (0.707) (-1.598) (-1.703) (-2.914) (-3.101) 
State GDP (Log) 0.097 0.097 0.032 0.032 4.232* 4.261* 
 
(0.525) (0.525) (1.375) (1.387) (1.950) (1.972) 
Local Employment (Log) 0.232 0.231 0.034 0.033 3.829 3.778 
 
(0.677) (0.674) (1.069) (1.047) (1.298) (1.280) 
Local Income (Log) 0.011 0.012 0.024 0.025 -0.018 -0.009 
 
(0.034) (0.038) (0.815) (0.831) (-0.007) (-0.003) 
Local Population (Log) 0.251 0.253 0.036 0.036 1.453 1.521 
 
(0.755) (0.759) (1.069) (1.090) (0.450) (0.471) 
Local Establishment (Log) -0.371* -0.372* -0.068*** -0.068*** -5.189** -5.192** 
 
(-1.686) (-1.688) (-2.905) (-2.908) (-2.342) (-2.350) 
State Interest Tax 0.015 0.015 0.002 0.002 0.268 0.266 
 
(1.233) (1.231) (1.055) (1.039) (1.183) (1.168) 
Tax Outside State 0.345*** 0.344*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 2.737*** 2.693*** 
 
(7.983) (7.915) (4.577) (4.564) (3.779) (3.753) 
Time Trend -0.020* -0.020* -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.274** -0.271** 
 
(-1.943) (-1.933) (-2.849) (-2.848) (-2.332) (-2.307) 
Constant -7.469** -7.476** -1.101*** -1.108*** -87.759*** -88.073*** 
  (-2.487) (-2.490) (-3.501) (-3.529) (-2.962) (-2.978) 
Observations 145,213 145,213 146,955 146,955 118,716 118,716 
Log Likelihood -16,496 -16,493 
    Pseudo R2 / Adj. R2 0.517 0.517 0.450 0.450 0.450 0.450 
Year, State, Dealer Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the Probit and OLS regression results for the impact of political donations on 
underwriter selections. The dependent variable for Models 1-2 is the categorical variable that equals 1 if 
the underwriter is hired. It equals 0 otherwise. The dependent variable for Models 3-4 is dealer’s market 
share. The dependent variable for Models 5-6 is dealer’s market share growth. The independent and 
control variables are defined in Appendix D. Models 2, 4 and 6 include an interaction term when 
donations are made to a government that the dealer has business with in the past 10 years. Year, 
Underwriter and State fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by local political 
subdivisions. Robust z/t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
The dependent variable in Model (1) and (4) is a dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if the underwriter u is hired as the lead underwriter by the local government i in that 
year t. It equals 0 if the underwriter is not selected in that year. The coefficient of 
Political Donation Dummy in Model (1) is 0.51 and significant at 1% level, suggesting 
that political connection is positively associated with an underwriter’s probability of 
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being hired. The coefficient of Dealer-Issuer History (Past 10) is also significant. This 
indicates that an underwriter will more likely be hired if this bank has been hired as the 
lead underwriter in the past 10 years. This suggests the pre-existing relationship between 
an underwriter and a bond issuer increases the bank’s chance of be hired again. Since 
both political connections and the existing business relations have significant impacts on 
the choice of underwriter, I include an interaction term for Political Donation Dummy 
and Dealer-Issuer History (Past 10) in the regression. Model (2) shows that the 
coefficient of this interaction term, Donation with History (Past 10), is significantly 
positive. This finding goes along with the transaction cost hypothesis that existing 
business relationships can reduce cost of searching and facilitate contracting process with 
business partners (Board 2011). Donating money to officials in a new political division 
will increase the marginal cost of political connections for an investment bank. From an 
issuer’s perspective, building mutual trust with new business partners usually takes extra 
time and effort (Furubotn and Richter 2010). Due to these aspects of transaction costs, 
both underwriters and issuers have incentives to stay with their well-acquainted business 
partners. More interestingly, political connections still play a significant role in 
increasing the amount of business for the previously hired underwriters. 
Although Deal-Issuer History (Past 10) still has significant power, the 
significance of Political Donation Dummy has dropped to 10% level. This suggests that 
contributing to a former client has stronger effect on an underwriter’s business, compared 
with contributing to a new client. Models (3) and (5) show the similar effect of political 
donations on whether an underwriter would be hired as the lead underwriter except that 
the dependent variables are market share and market share growth, respectively.  
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I use an OLS regression to test the donation’s impact on an underwriter’s market 
share. In Equation (6), the dependent variable is logged underwriter’s market share. The 
independent variable of interest, Political donation, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the lead underwriter makes payments to the issuer official’s political party in the most 
recent 5 years.  captures the impact of political connections on an underwriter’s local 
market share. 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑢,𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼𝑢,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑢,𝑖,𝑡     
                                                      + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑢,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑢,𝑖,𝑡                                 (6) 
I use market share growth to measure the relative change in an underwriter’s 
market share. Equation (7) shows the test on contributions’ effect on a contributing 
underwriter’s market share change. 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑢,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑢,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑢,𝑖,𝑡     
                                             +𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑢,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑢,𝑖,𝑡                                           (7) 
Models (3) - (6) report the regression result for the rests. For example, politically 
connected banks are associated with 19.6%15 more business in their underwriting market 
share as shown in Model (3). By including the interaction term Donation with History 
(Past 10), Models (4) and (6) show that the interaction term is significantly positive but 
T-values of Political Donation Dummy drop to 0.170 and 0.291. This is consistent with 
Model (2). It suggests that contributing to an unfamiliar issuer has no effects on the 
contributing bank’s business.  
Taken together, the finding in Table 3 suggests that contributing banks obtain 
more underwriting business than non-contributing banks. This effect is mainly driven by 
                                                             
15 On average, contributing banks’ market share is 33.59% while non-contributing banks’ share are 13.99%. 
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contributions made to officials having pre-existing business relations with the 
contributing underwriter in the past.  
To test the economic outcome of political donations on bond issuance cost, I use 
underwriting fees as the dependent variable in the analysis.  𝛽 in Equation (8) captures 
the impact of political donations on bond issuance costs.  
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑢,𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼𝑢,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑢,𝑖,𝑡          
                                                       + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑢,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑢,𝑖,𝑡                                (8) 
Underwriter’s fee, also referred to as gross spread, is a major part of the municipal 
bond issuance cost16.  Joffe (2015) documents that underwriting fees cover 46.03% of the 
overall issuance cost on average. Butler, Fauver, and Mortal (2009) use underwriting fees 
in their test for the importance of an issuer’s political integrity. While they don’t find that 
corrupt states are associated with higher underwriter’s fees, they document that 
underwriter’s fees have significantly dropped since the introduction of Rule G-37. They 
suggest: “campaign contributions might generate a quid pro quo in the form of higher 
fees for underwriting services”. Inspired by Butler, Fauver, and Mortal’s (2009) study, I 
use lead underwriter’s fees as the measure of cost of bond issuance.  
Table 4 presents the OLS results for donation’s impact on underwriting fees. The 
dependent variable is logged underwriting fee for each bond issue. Due to the data 
availability issue (Brown 2016), 19,478 issues have available gross spread data out of the 
total 26,512 bond issues during 1994-2013. After cleaning out the outliers, there are 
18,164 bond issues included in the regression analysis17. The independent variable of 
interest in Models (1) and (2) is Political Donation Dummy. It equals 1 if the lead 
                                                             
16 See MSRB’s definition of gross spread on http://msrb.org/msrb1/pdfs/Understanding-Gross-Spread.pdf 
17 There are about 31% of gross spreads in the bond issue sample are not available to the empirical study, 
which may result in a missing value bias. See summary statistics on gross spreads in Appendix C. 
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underwriter has made political contributions to the issuer in the recent 5 years. It equals 0 
otherwise.  
Table 4  
Political Connection and Issuance Cost 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Political Donation Dummy 0.016 0.040** 
  
 
 
(0.691) (2.313) 
  
 Donation Amount (100K) 
  
0.011 0.035** 
 
 
  
(0.799) (2.378) 
 Donation Amount ($1,000) 
    
1,269.759*** 
 
    
(3.102) 
Dealer Issuer History 
(Past10) 
0.014 -0.005 0.014 -0.003 -17,013.117 
 
(1.112) (-0.412) (1.186) (-0.260) (-0.552) 
Local Office -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 20,246.916 
 
(-0.818) (-0.902) (-0.764) (-0.796) (0.638) 
Investment Grade -0.111*** -0.100*** -0.111*** -0.099*** -232,613.125 
 
(-3.341) (-2.975) (-3.332) (-2.960) (-1.369) 
Rating Missing -0.026 -0.054 -0.025 -0.053 -44,462.648 
 
(-0.571) (-1.253) (-0.563) (-1.236) (-0.239) 
Maturity (Log) 0.209*** 0.197*** 0.209*** 0.197*** 175,160.875*** 
 
(13.250) (12.452) (13.218) (12.394) (8.816) 
Coupon (Log) 0.275*** 0.263*** 0.275*** 0.263*** -25,285.889 
 
(35.089) (32.931) (35.077) (32.904) (-0.470) 
Issue Size (Log) -0.149*** -0.144*** -0.149*** -0.144*** 
 
 
(-20.103) (-19.730) (-20.089) (-19.741) 
 
G.O. Bond -0.096*** -0.097*** -0.096*** -0.098*** 81,980.531 
 
(-3.600) (-4.043) (-3.575) (-4.052) (0.952) 
Lagged Dealer Share (Log) -0.068*** -0.006 -0.068*** -0.008 25,430.686 
 
(-4.647) (-0.418) (-4.849) (-0.606) (0.479) 
Lagged Local Share (Log) 0.059 0.056 0.057 0.052 -112,991.023 
 
(1.168) (1.215) (1.101) (1.104) (-0.610) 
Lagged Dealer-Local Share 
(Log) 
0.023 -0.010 0.025 -0.004 363,932.688*** 
(0.331) (-0.250) (0.369) (-0.087) (3.414) 
Public Dummy -0.002 0.200 -0.002 0.168 -15,827.184 
 
(-0.176) (1.383) (-0.218) (1.131) (-0.051) 
Dealer Age (Log) 0.030*** 0.028 0.030*** 0.038 154,035.547 
 
(3.777) (0.670) (4.106) (0.860) (1.328) 
Advisor -0.044*** -0.033** -0.043*** -0.033** 66,867.133 
 
(-3.024) (-2.359) (-3.008) (-2.330) (1.564) 
No. Managers 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 258,434.609*** 
 
(7.576) (8.724) (7.563) (8.718) (5.448) 
Tax Exempt -0.065*** -0.062*** -0.065*** -0.062*** -17,006.934 
 
(-5.128) (-5.432) (-5.140) (-5.454) (-0.198) 
Insured 0.031** 0.033*** 0.031** 0.033*** 83,810.703** 
 
(2.307) (2.780) (2.297) (2.717) (2.310) 
Guaranteed 0.069 0.072 0.070 0.074 813,255.000* 
 
(1.061) (1.257) (1.087) (1.287) (1.985) 
Letter Credit -0.039* -0.047** -0.038 -0.046** -200,323.250** 
 
(-1.688) (-2.181) (-1.656) (-2.153) (-2.316) 
State GDP (Log) -0.042 -0.035 -0.038 -0.029 -912,666.125* 
 
(-0.344) (-0.310) (-0.313) (-0.255) (-1.733) 
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Local Employment (Log) 0.100 0.174 0.093 0.167 -825,478.125 
 
(0.307) (0.535) (0.284) (0.513) (-0.562) 
Local Income (Log) 0.005 0.022 0.002 0.014 1364468.875 
 
(0.020) (0.087) (0.007) (0.056) (0.964) 
Local Population (Log) 0.062 -0.019 0.072 -0.002 934,901.875 
 
(0.190) (-0.058) (0.219) (-0.006) (0.550) 
Local Establishment (Log) 0.003 -0.015 -0.000 -0.022 577,506.750* 
 
(0.025) (-0.142) (-0.000) (-0.211) (1.706) 
State Interest Tax 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.005 26,546.957 
 
(1.495) (1.106) (1.482) (1.043) (1.111) 
Tax Outside State 0.059** 0.070** 0.061** 0.075** 141,691.703*** 
 
(2.257) (2.362) (2.345) (2.465) (3.234) 
Time Trend -0.006 -0.009 -0.006 -0.009 744.014 
 
(-0.798) (-1.291) (-0.799) (-1.316) (0.024) 
Constant 1.662 1.683 1.637 1.601 -1.324e+07 
  (0.581) (0.580) (0.572) (0.553) (-0.914) 
Observations 18,164 18,164 18,164 18,164 18,164 
Adjusted R-square 0.557 0.586 0.557 0.586 0.478 
Year, Issuer Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Underwriter FE No Yes No Yes Yes 
This table reports the OLS regression results for the impact of political donations on bond issuance costs. 
The dependent variable is logged underwriting fees for a bond issue. The independent and control 
variables are defined in Appendix D. Year and Issuer fixed effects are included. Standard errors are 
clustered by local political subdivisions. Underwriter fixed effect is included in Models (2), (4), and (5). 
Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at  the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Without controlling for underwriters’ fixed effect, the coefficient of Political 
Donation Dummy in Model (1) is positive but insignificant. Butler, Fauver, and Mortal 
(2009) suggest underwriters may have with-in group effect on underwriting fees they 
charge. It is important to control for underwriters’ fixed effect in the regression. By 
including underwriters’ fixed effect, the coefficient of Political Donation Dummy in 
Model (2) is 0.04 and significantly positive. That is, when an underwriter is selling bonds 
for a connected issuer, the underwriting fee is 4%18 higher than if the same underwriter is 
selling bonds for an unconnected issuer. This is consistent with Brown’s (2016) finding 
that contributing banks charge 2.9% higher fees than non-contributing banks in his 
sample of 24 states. 
                                                             
18 On average, the underwriting fee for a contributing underwriter is $6.90 per $1,000 bond while the 
underwriting fee for a noncontributing underwriter is $7.18 per $1,000 bond. 
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To examine whether the amount fees are correlated with the amount of political 
donations, I use the total amount of payments to proxy the extent of political connection 
between an underwriter and a government official. In Equation (9), I use the total amount 
of payments made by underwriter u to issuer official i’s political party over the recent 5 
years as Donation Amount. 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑢,𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑢,𝑖,𝑡
𝑡
𝑡−4                     (9)  
The independent variable of interest in Models (3) and (4) is the total amount of 
political donations in the recent 5 years. The coefficient of Donation Amount (100K) is 
0.035 and significantly positive. This suggests the amount of donations is also positively 
associated with underwriting fees. The dependent variable of Model (5) is the product of 
gross spread and total offer amount of each bond issue. It measures the total amount of 
underwriting fee an issuer pays for the underwriting service. The independent variable of 
interest is Donation Amount (K). It measures the effect of a $1,000 donation on total 
underwriting fees. The coefficient is 1,270 and statistically significant. That is, a donation 
of $1,000 is associated with $1,270 higher total compensation for a contributing 
underwriter. 
Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that hiring contributing banks is associated 
with higher issuance cost for municipal issuers. The amount of the political contribution 
is positively related with the amount of compensation an underwriter receives.  
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CHAPTER V 
IDENTIFICATION AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Political Party Connections 
To further study the political impact on underwriting banks’ business, I test the 
effect of donations that exclusively made to only one of the two political parties. I define 
a contribution a Republican Donation when the amount of an underwriter’s donations to 
the Republican Party is at least twice as much as the amount to the Democrat Party. A 
contribution is defined as a Democrat Donation when the amount of an underwriter’s 
donations to the Democrat Party is at least twice as much as the amount to the Republican 
Party. Similarly, if a bond is from a year when the Republican Party dominates the state’s 
administration office (including governor, lieutenant governor, state senate and state 
house), I define the bond issue a Republican Issue.  A Democrat Issue is defined for an 
issue in the opposite case. With a subsample of state-level issuers, I keep bonds that are 
either Republican Issues or Democrat Issues. 
Table 5 reports the effect of different political party connections. It includes a 
subsample of bond issues either from a republican-dominated state-year or from a 
democrat-dominated state-year.  
Table 5  
Political Party Connection and Underwriter Market Share 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Same Party Connection 0.519*** 0.152*** 14.169*** 
   
 
(4.977) (2.821) (2.801) 
   Opposite Party Connection 
   
0.233 -0.075 -9.401 
    
(1.047) (-1.005) (-1.205) 
Dealer Issuer History (Past10) 0.970*** 0.132*** 11.674*** 0.966*** 0.130*** 11.468*** 
 
(22.459) (10.795) (10.351) (22.568) (10.599) (10.124) 
Local Office 0.440*** 0.063*** 6.393*** 0.432*** 0.066*** 6.610*** 
 
(7.812) (5.407) (5.727) (7.702) (5.621) (5.997) 
Lagged Dealer Share (Log) 0.630*** 0.157*** 14.788*** 0.626*** 0.158*** 14.843*** 
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(11.574) (8.359) (8.237) (11.549) (8.276) (8.248) 
Lagged Local Share (Log) 0.520** 0.048 6.690* 0.491** 0.036 5.612 
 
(2.532) (1.470) (1.791) (2.268) (1.138) (1.586) 
Lagged Dealer-Local Share (Log) 0.645*** 0.688*** 65.127*** 0.638*** 0.685*** 64.915*** 
 
(19.369) (24.029) (24.405) (19.360) (23.743) (24.223) 
Public Dummy 0.663*** 0.226*** 24.990*** 0.603** 0.217*** 24.266*** 
 
(2.618) (4.371) (4.769) (2.484) (4.133) (4.699) 
Dealer Age (Log) 0.037 -0.019** -2.660** 0.043 -0.020** -2.933** 
 
(0.394) (-2.257) (-2.418) (0.475) (-2.358) (-2.653) 
State GDP (Log) 0.500 0.066 2.470 0.472 0.054 1.331 
 
(0.798) (0.837) (0.319) (0.749) (0.710) (0.175) 
Local Employment (Log) -1.307 -0.104 -5.095 -1.117 -0.144 -6.378 
 
(-1.049) (-0.528) (-0.239) (-0.873) (-0.763) (-0.332) 
Local Income (Log) 1.131 0.159 18.191 1.068 0.185 19.265 
 
(0.971) (1.046) (1.147) (0.944) (1.261) (1.241) 
Local Population (Log) 1.104 0.086 7.016 0.988 0.145 10.540 
 
(0.807) (0.445) (0.325) (0.723) (0.782) (0.514) 
Local Establishment (Log) 0.021 -0.045 -7.429 -0.037 -0.051 -8.018 
 
(0.052) (-0.689) (-1.114) (-0.090) (-0.808) (-1.329) 
State Interest Tax 0.026 0.007** 0.756** 0.026 0.006* 0.658** 
 
(1.300) (2.233) (2.313) (1.246) (1.998) (2.084) 
Tax Outside State 0.310*** 0.027*** 3.208*** 0.320*** 0.027*** 3.062*** 
 
(5.420) (2.938) (3.147) (5.875) (2.809) (3.267) 
Time Trend -0.086*** -0.011** -0.856* -0.083*** -0.011*** -0.817* 
 
(-2.847) (-2.661) (-1.951) (-2.816) (-2.845) (-1.922) 
Constant -18.410 -1.801 -178.073 -17.774 -2.150 -200.886 
  (-1.337) (-0.988) (-0.926) (-1.302) (-1.210) (-1.051) 
Observations 33,876 35,137 33,282 33,717 34,980 33,125 
Log Likelihood -5,377 
  
-5,310 
  Pseudo R2/ Adj. R2 0.506 0.551 0.535 0.503 0.548 0.533 
Year, State, Dealer Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the Probit and OLS regression results for the impact of political party connection on 
underwriters market share. The dependent variable in Models (1) and (4) is the categorical variable that 
equals 1 if the underwriter is hired as the lead underwriter. It equals 0 otherwise. The dependent variable 
for Models (2) and (4) is underwriter’s market share. The dependent variable for Models (3) and (6) is 
underwriter’s market share growth. The independent and control variables are defined in Appendix D. 
Year, Underwriter and State fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by local political 
subdivisions. Robust z/t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
The dependent variable includes the probability of an underwriter being hired, an 
underwriter’s logged market share and the logged change in market share. The 
independent variable of interest in Models (1) - (3) is a dummy variable Same Party 
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Connection that equals 1 if the underwriter has been party A’s exclusive contributor and 
party A also dominates the state’s legislature in that year. It equals 0 otherwise. The 
independent variable of Models (4) - (6) is Opposite Party Connection that represents the 
opposite scenario as in Models (1) - (3). 
The coefficients of Same Party Connection in Models (1) - (3) are significantly 
positive, suggesting that donating to the right political party is positively associated with 
more business for an underwriting bank. The coefficients of Opposite Party Connection 
in Models (4) - (6) become insignificant. This finding suggests contributing to the 
opposite party has no effects on the amount of an underwriter’s bond business from a 
single-party-dominated state. 
The finding of Table 5 suggests only donating to the right party is associated with 
more underwriting business for contributing underwriters. Donating money to the 
opposite party has no significant effects on an underwriter’s bond business, compared 
with non-contributing banks. Further, the finding indicates that the donation effect in 
Table 3 is mainly driven by contributions made to the right party. 
Close Gubernatorial Elections 
To overcome the endogeneity challenge, I employ a Regression Discontinuity 
Design (RDD) using gubernatorial elections. With a threshold of 10% for voting results, I 
compare the market share change of underwriters connected with winning candidates and 
that of underwriters connected with unelected candidates. This design allows me to 
utilize the randomness of close election outcome to verify the causal effect of political 
connections on underwriters’ market share. For close elections, it’s difficult to predict the 
election outcome or pre-determine a winner that will have the political power in the 
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office. I assume contributors in these elections are randomly assigned and the ex post 
change in their market share is most likely caused by the election result. 
The dependent variable in Table 6 is logged market share change between the 
year after the election and the election year. This variable captures any change in a 
contributing underwriter’s market share after the election. Models (1) - (3) include 
underwriting banks that only support one candidate. The coefficient of Won in Model (1) 
is positive and significant at 10%, suggesting that underwriters contributing to the 
candidate who wins the election would experience an increase in their market share after 
the election. 
Table 6  
Political Connection’s Effect after Close Elections 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
RDD Rep Dem Hedge Hedge-Rep Hedge-Dem 
Won 0.664* 1.109** 0.260 
   
 
(1.688) (2.123) (0.441) 
   Vote Share -11.929* -17.653** -4.363 -0.000 -2.341 2.341 
 
(-1.756) (-2.032) (-0.408) (-0.000) (-0.759) (0.686) 
Won-Vote Share 16.300** 13.871 15.508 
   
 
(1.988) (1.295) (1.227) 
   Donated-Won 
   
0.664* 1.109** 0.260 
    
(1.704) (2.081) (0.455) 
Donated 
   
-0.471 -0.613 -0.346 
    
(-1.462) (-1.393) (-0.730) 
Donated Vote Share 
   
-11.929* -15.312 -6.704 
    
(-1.679) (-1.631) (-0.615) 
Donated-Won-Vote 
Share    
16.300** 13.871 15.508 
   
(2.007) (1.269) (1.268) 
Constant -1.644*** -1.768*** -1.502*** -1.173*** -1.156*** -1.156*** 
  (-5.579) (-4.520) (-3.397) (-8.610) (-6.263) (-5.661) 
Observations 150 79 71 230 119 111 
Adjusted R-square 0.0357 0.0287 0.0567 0.0223 0.0140 0.0328 
This table reports the result of regression discontinuity design for the impact of close governor election 
on underwriter’s market share growth. The dependent variable is the underwriter’s market share growth. 
The threshold used for RDD is 10%. The independent and control variables are defined in Appendix D. 
Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at  the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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The interaction term Won-Vote Share is the product of Won and Vote Share. The 
coefficient is significantly positive at 5% level. This suggests that the more votes a 
winning candidate receives, the more business the contributing underwriter will receive 
after the election. Models (2) and (3) include campaign candidates from the Republican 
Party and the Democratic Party separately. The results indicate that the impact of political 
contributions is only significant for candidates from the Republican Party. This is 
consistent with the finding of Gimpel, Lee, and Parrott (2014) that more than one third of 
economic sectors have a clear party tilt leaning toward to Republicans than to Democrats. 
They show that many firms from finance and insurance sectors slant toward the 
Republican Party rather than the Democratic Party. This lends support to the statistics in 
Appendix B where I find the total donations made to the Republican Party are 
significantly more than donations to the Democratic Party. This finding is consistent with 
Birnbaum’s (2004) view that “American corporates are growing less and less evenhanded 
and more and more Republican”.  
Models (4) - (6) include underwriters that make contributions to more than one 
candidate in a gubernatorial campaign. The variable of interest Donated-Won has 
consistent coefficient and significance level with Won in Models (1) - (3). The positive 
effect suggests that only contributions to the candidate who wins the election are 
associated with more business for an underwriting bank.  
State-level Corruption Convictions 
To alleviate the concern of omitted variables, I apply a two-stage regression 
design using state-level corruption convictions as the instrumental variable. According to 
Butler, Fauver, and Mortal (2009), corruption plays an important role in municipal bond 
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issues. They find highly corrupt states experience political integrity issues that can raise 
the default risk of the underlying bonds. In Table 7, I construct the annual corruption 
index using the number of state-level corruption convictions. The corruption index is 
defined as the lagged three-year moving average of corruption convictions per 1,000 
people in each state in a given year. In the first stage, I run the Probit regression to 
estimate how this state-level corruption affects the likelihood an underwriter pays 
donations to local political parties.  
Table 7  
Two-stage Regressions for Market Share and Issuance Cost 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Corruption [t-3, t-1] 7.896* 
    
 
(1.834) 
    Predicted Donation 
 
1.655*** 0.501*** 44.596*** 0.101** 
  
(6.255) (4.027) (4.028) (2.284) 
Dealer Issuer History (Past10) 0.722*** 0.862*** 0.165*** 15.117*** -0.003 
 
(10.125) (36.728) (19.719) (17.671) (-0.233) 
Local Office 0.803*** 0.361*** 0.038*** 3.728*** -0.023* 
 
(11.104) (12.485) (6.067) (6.005) (-1.936) 
Lagged Dealer Share (Log) -0.175*** 0.545*** 0.077*** 9.630*** 0.007 
 
(-2.726) (19.487) (13.114) (14.064) (0.390) 
Lagged Local Share (Log) 0.429** 0.848*** -0.006 -0.155 0.008 
 
(2.555) (10.958) (-0.514) (-0.147) (0.159) 
Lagged Dealer-Local Share (Log) 0.243*** 0.592*** 0.673*** 63.870*** -0.048 
 
(8.002) (27.238) (31.300) (32.974) (-0.996) 
Public Dummy -0.607 0.578*** 0.138*** 15.503*** -0.029 
 
(-1.085) (3.014) (6.682) (6.178) (-0.185) 
Dealer Age (Log) 0.147 -0.115 -0.017* -2.724** 0.099 
 
(1.157) (-1.461) (-1.743) (-2.220) (1.611) 
State GDP (Log) -0.307*** 0.079 0.032 4.089* -0.045 
 
(-5.712) (0.491) (1.357) (1.657) (-0.372) 
Local Employment (Log) -0.529 -0.252* 0.001 1.701 0.025 
 
(-1.436) (-1.707) (0.095) (1.069) (0.096) 
Local Income (Log) 0.781*** 0.038 -0.000 -1.853 0.120 
 
(2.687) (0.213) (-0.030) (-0.965) (0.293) 
Local Population (Log) 0.658 0.362*** 0.017 -0.313 0.001 
 
(1.583) (2.795) (1.161) (-0.202) (0.002) 
Local Establishment (Log) 0.204 -0.004 -0.014 -0.995 -0.012 
 
(0.771) (-0.026) (-0.876) (-0.576) (-0.099) 
State Interest Tax -0.083*** 0.013 0.000 -0.046 0.006 
 
(-3.411) (0.926) (0.226) (-0.203) (0.672) 
Tax Outside State 0.459*** -0.037 -0.014 -1.517 0.095*** 
 
(3.155) (-0.307) (-0.974) (-1.072) (6.797) 
Time Trend -0.069*** -0.029*** -0.002** -0.197 -0.005 
 
(-6.701) (-3.056) (-2.075) (-1.481) (-0.600) 
Investment Grade 
    
-0.076* 
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(-1.918) 
Rating Missing 
    
-0.029 
     
(-0.576) 
Maturity (Log) 
    
0.196*** 
     
(12.000) 
Coupon (Log) 
    
0.249*** 
     
(28.135) 
Issue Size (Log) 
    
-0.145*** 
     
(-19.674) 
G.O. Bond 
    
-0.104*** 
     
(-4.302) 
Advisor 
    
-0.030** 
     
(-2.153) 
No. Managers 
    
0.021*** 
     
(8.074) 
Tax Exempt 
    
-0.061*** 
     
(-5.519) 
Insured 
    
0.044*** 
     
(3.077) 
Guaranteed 
    
0.071 
     
(1.135) 
Letter Credit 
    
-0.068*** 
     
(-2.837) 
Constant -11.973*** -5.387** -0.554* -42.276 2.035 
  (-3.648) (-2.336) (-1.759) (-1.222) (0.635) 
Observations 314,531 207,394 211,477 144,943 14,318 
Pseudo R2 / Adj. R2 0.393 0.492 0.329 0.349 0.581 
Log Likelihood -5,338 -18,727 
   
Year, State, Dealer Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the two-stage least square results for the impact of political donations on 
underwriters’ market share and bond issuance costs. The dependent variable in Model (1) is the 
dichotomous variable that equals 1 if there is a donation during the recent five years. It equals 0 
otherwise. Corruption measures the percentage of corruption convictions per 1,000 people in a state 
each year. The other independent variables are defined in Appendix D. The dependent variable in 
Model (2) is the categorical variable that equals 1 if the underwriter is hired. It equals 0 otherwise. The 
dependent variable of Model (3) is logged dealer market share in the local area each year. Model (4) 
includes the market share growth as the dependent variable. The dependent variable of Model (5) is 
logged underwriting fees for a bond issue. Year and Underwriter fixed effects are included in Model 
(1). Year, Underwriter and State/Issuer fixed effects are included in Models (2)-(5). Standard errors are 
clustered by local political subdivisions. Robust z/t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Model (1) in Table 7 presents the result of the first-stage regression. Corruption 
level is positively associated with the probability that an underwriter makes donations. 
This meets the assumption that the IV is significantly correlated with the likelihood of 
donations. Since high corruption convictions do not necessarily result in high market 
share for contributing banks, I assume that there are no direct causal relations between 
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the IV and the unexplained residual term in the original models19. Models (2) - (5) 
present the second-stage regression20 results using the predicted likelihood of paying 
donations as the instrumental variable. The finding shows that the previous findings still 
hold in the two-stage. The number of corruption convictions has explanatory power for 
contributing banks’ market share through political contributions.  
In the first-stage analysis, there are several factors also playing an important role 
in explaining the likelihood of making donations. For example, Local Office is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the underwriter has local office in the issuer’s state. It equals 0 
otherwise. Model (1) shows the coefficient of Local Office is significantly positive. This 
indicates that an underwriter with an office in the local area is more likely to donate 
money to local officials. This is consistent with the point of Butler, Fauver, and Mortal 
(2009) that a local office can help the investment bank gather “soft” information on local 
politics and economy. The coefficient of Lagged Dealer Share is significantly negative, 
suggesting that investment banks with good reputation are less likely to make political 
donations. This is consistent with the point of Duchin and Sosyura (2012) that firms with 
good performance are not likely to rely on political connections. Lagged Local Share has 
significantly positive impact on the presence of political donations. This suggests that 
investment banks are more likely to make donations to issuers with recent large bond 
offerings. A possible explanation is that contributing banks are more likely to target at 
issuers with greater potential business opportunities. The coefficient of Lagged Dealer-
Local Share is significantly positive, suggesting investment banks are more likely to 
                                                             
19 The two conditions for a valid instrumental variable Z: Cov(Z, X)≠0 and Cov(Z, ε)=0. 
20 Technically, it is a three-stage procedure because in I regress y on y-hat in the second stage and include 
the fitted y from the second stage in the third stage. There are several advantages, as discussed in Adams, 
Almeida, and Ferreira (2009) and Wooldridge (2002), for this procedure compared with a “pseudo-IV” 
procedure and alternative tests show that the results are essentially the same using either method. 
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make donations to issuers that they have businesses with before. This is consistent with 
the finding of Table 3 that donations made to a new issuer client have a weak impact on 
underwriters’ business. 
Negotiated and Competitive Deals 
To isolate the effect of donation on investment banks’ underwriting business, I 
use competitive deals as a benchmark in a difference-in-differences design in Table 8. A 
competitive deal is a type of municipal bond offering method where an underwriter 
submits a sealed bid to the issuer and the issuer awards the underwriting contract to the 
bidder with the best price. The competitive sale is usually preferred when the municipal 
bond is relatively less complex to price (Marlowe 2009). Since the competitive deal is an 
auction-based offering method, the underwriter selection process is unlikely to be 
affected by an investment bank’s political connections. Due to this advantage of a 
competitive deal, rule G-37 does not include competitive deals in the business prohibition 
section21. Brown (2016) also shows there is no significant relation between a lead 
underwriter’s contribution and the issuance cost for a competitive sale. While the offering 
process is not perfectly identical for a competitive deal and a negotiated deal, the amount 
of competitive sales can reflect the market share that an underwriter may otherwise 
receive without any political impact. If some unobserved factors cause both political 
donations and the amount of business between an underwriter and an issuer, it would 
likely affect both negotiated and competitive sales. This strategy can help control for 
unobserved factors that could pre-determine the business relation between an investment 
bank and an issuer.  
                                                             
21 See Section (g): xii of MSRB’s Rule G-37. http://www.msrb.org/Rules-and-Interpretations/MSRB-
Rules/General/Rule-G-37.aspx 
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Table 8  
Difference-in-differences Analyses for Negotiated and Competitive Deals 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Political Donation Dummy -0.097 -0.145*** -14.871*** -0.108*** 
 
(-0.959) (-3.251) (-3.145) (-2.924) 
Negotiated Dummy 0.537*** 0.045*** 4.247*** 0.103*** 
 
(6.891) (5.527) (5.718) (3.233) 
Negotiated-Donation 0.821*** 0.473*** 43.024*** 0.152*** 
 
(5.147) (6.616) (5.968) (3.448) 
Dealer Issuer History (Past10) 0.845*** 0.097*** 9.190*** -0.016 
 
(35.246) (12.987) (11.652) (-1.229) 
Local Office 0.350*** 0.028*** 3.394*** -0.013 
 
(16.448) (7.572) (8.106) (-0.991) 
Lagged Dealer Share (Log) 0.610*** 0.133*** 14.244*** -0.006 
 
(23.386) (18.131) (18.273) (-0.462) 
Lagged Local Share (Log) 0.468*** 0.007 -0.620 0.072 
 
(6.916) (0.967) (-0.774) (1.430) 
Lagged Dealer-Local Share (Log) 0.427*** 0.474*** 47.652*** -0.021 
 
(33.987) (41.413) (38.726) (-0.458) 
Public Dummy 0.023 0.050** 9.409*** -0.029 
 
(0.187) (2.468) (4.384) (-0.290) 
Dealer Age (Log) 0.073* -0.006* -1.262*** 0.021 
 
(1.718) (-1.926) (-2.671) (0.548) 
State GDP (Log) -0.026 0.021 2.762 -0.044 
 
(-0.191) (1.333) (1.575) (-0.423) 
Local Employment (Log) -0.255 0.001 -2.080 0.113 
 
(-1.020) (0.110) (-0.727) (0.362) 
Local Income (Log) 0.109 0.008 1.861 0.070 
 
(0.775) (0.754) (0.988) (0.334) 
Local Population (Log) 0.196 0.013 2.719 0.090 
 
(1.115) (0.935) (1.115) (0.312) 
Local Establishment (Log) 0.119 -0.013 -0.718 -0.026 
 
(0.927) (-1.139) (-0.485) (-0.228) 
State Interest Tax 0.013 0.002 0.077 0.004 
 
(1.466) (1.415) (0.582) (0.804) 
Tax Outside State 0.164*** -0.002 0.570 0.055* 
 
(6.868) (-0.447) (0.406) (1.817) 
Time Trend -0.021*** -0.003*** -0.344*** -0.010 
 
(-2.734) (-3.254) (-3.242) (-1.484) 
Investment Grade 
   
-0.083** 
    
(-2.213) 
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Rating Missing 
   
-0.039 
    
(-0.877) 
Maturity (Log) 
   
0.231*** 
    
(17.129) 
Coupon (Log) 
   
0.261*** 
    
(33.433) 
Issue Size (Log) 
   
-0.147*** 
    
(-22.223) 
G.O. Bond 
   
-0.109*** 
    
(-5.084) 
Advisor 
   
-0.041*** 
    
(-3.234) 
No. Managers 
   
0.022*** 
    
(9.335) 
Tax Exempt 
   
-0.057*** 
    
(-5.080) 
Insured 
   
0.055*** 
    
(4.412) 
Guaranteed 
   
0.073 
    
(1.207) 
Letter Credit 
   
-0.040* 
    
(-1.868) 
Constant -4.745*** -0.453** -60.043** 0.567 
  (-2.716) (-2.125) (-2.164) (0.245) 
Observations 293,910 293,910 221,409 20,719 
Pseudo R2 / Adj. R2 0.438 0.304 0.314 0.569 
Log Likelihood -30,381 
  
 
Year, State, Dealer Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the difference-in-differences analysis results for political connection’s impact on 
underwriters’ market share and bond issuance costs. The sample includes both negotiated deals and 
competitive deals. The dependent variables in Models (1) - (4) are dummy variable of being hired, 
underwriter’s market share, underwriter’s market share growth, and underwriting fees. Political 
Donation Dummy equals 1 if there is a donation during the recent five years. It equals 0 otherwise. 
Negotiated Dummy equals 1 if an issue is a negotiated deal. It equals 0 otherwise. Negotiated-Donation 
is an interaction term of Political Donation Dummy and Negotiated Dummy. The independent variables 
are defined in Appendix D. Year, Underwriter and State/Issuer fixed effects are included. Standard 
errors are clustered by local political subdivisions in Models (1) - (3) and by issuer in Model (4). Robust 
z/t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at  the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Table 8 presents the results for the diff-in-diff regression. The dependent variable 
in Model (1) is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the underwriter is hired. It equals 0 
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otherwise22. The coefficient of the interaction term Negotiated-Donation in Model (1) is 
significantly positive. This means political donations are associated with an underwriter’s 
chance of being hired for a negotiated sale after controlling for the underwriter choice of 
a competitive deal. The dependent variable in Model (2) is logged dealer market share 
and the coefficient of Negotiated-Donation is also significantly positive. This means an 
investment bank’s political donations are positively associated with its market share on 
negotiated deals even after controlling for the market share of competitive deals between 
the issuer and the underwriter. The reported result in Model (3) is consistent with the 
baseline results. Negotiated Dummy in Model (4) has a positive coefficient of 0.103, 
which lends support to the finding of Brown (2016) that gross spread of negotiated deals 
is significantly higher than that of competitive deals due to the complexity of negotiated 
sales. After controlling for the gross spread difference between a negotiated deal and a 
competitive deal, it is still more expensive to sell bonds through contributing banks. 
Rewarding Behavior Analysis  
Table 9 presents the robustness test for the possible reversed effect between 
market share change and an underwriter’s future donation.  
Table 9  
Rewarding Effect on Future Political Donations 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Market Share 
(Log) 
7.745 11.470 30.744* 
   
 
(1.208) (1.030) (1.669) 
   
Market Share 
Growth (Log) 
   
0.130 0.187 0.369 
   
(1.412) (1.164) (1.556) 
Dealer-Issuer 
History (Past10) 
-7.396 -27.542 -37.062 -12.471 -36.767 -48.844 
(-0.289) (-0.542) (-0.510) (-0.441) (-0.661) (-0.615) 
Past Donation 
Dummy [t-2,t] 
3,056.038*** 6,697.117*** 9,293.694*** 3,225.976*** 7,021.249*** 9,682.668*** 
(4.162) (4.662) (4.468) (4.355) (4.825) (4.590) 
                                                             
22 In an unreported test, coefficient of Donation Dummy is not significant for competitive deals. It suggests 
that political donations have no impact on an underwriter’s market share of competitive deals. 
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Local Office 25.152** 36.501* 59.578** 29.670** 42.125* 73.156** 
 
(2.394) (1.921) (2.146) (2.515) (1.920) (2.228) 
Lagged Dealer 
Share (Log) 
-23.857** -50.693** -75.913** -26.705** -58.731** -89.952** 
(-2.134) (-2.152) (-2.171) (-2.174) (-2.183) (-2.222) 
Lagged Local 
Share (Log) 
135.045*** 269.583*** 420.145*** 153.352*** 308.266*** 485.114*** 
(4.317) (4.406) (4.228) (5.764) (5.799) (5.577) 
Lagged Dealer-
Local (Log) 
76.278** 136.850** 191.111** 75.861** 136.016** 191.960** 
(2.460) (2.314) (2.293) (2.336) (2.201) (2.227) 
Public Dummy 37.753 62.774 75.057 39.418 70.807 87.009 
 
(0.885) (0.747) (0.638) (0.706) (0.628) (0.526) 
Dealer Age 
(Log) 
-9.166 -11.452 -8.077 -3.752 -6.428 -4.286 
(-0.585) (-0.370) (-0.173) (-0.148) (-0.125) (-0.055) 
State GDP (Log) -30.873 -53.478 -36.559 -15.688 -35.466 1.991 
 
(-0.570) (-0.502) (-0.230) (-0.285) (-0.317) (0.012) 
Employment 
(Log) 
88.663 152.102 223.021 209.446** 372.177** 541.841** 
(1.354) (1.325) (1.331) (2.523) (2.497) (2.355) 
Local Income 
(Log) 
24.603 57.703 101.361 -28.093 -35.864 -26.978 
(0.353) (0.459) (0.561) (-0.402) (-0.276) (-0.136) 
Local Population 
(Log) 
-40.679 -64.608 -87.635 -139.006 -242.028 -333.532 
(-0.458) (-0.400) (-0.377) (-1.521) (-1.391) (-1.246) 
Establishment 
(Log) 
-54.848 -106.077 -164.631 -73.964 -143.172 -231.138 
(-0.732) (-0.791) (-0.859) (-0.805) (-0.868) (-0.967) 
State Interest 
Tax 
-3.345 -7.493 -7.612 -5.500 -12.465 -12.676 
(-0.799) (-0.908) (-0.637) (-0.885) (-1.021) (-0.723) 
Tax Outside 
State 
9.834 21.471 35.529 10.099 25.078 42.569 
(0.567) (0.623) (0.705) (0.534) (0.663) (0.759) 
Time Trend 1.004 1.244 -1.589 1.772 3.463 0.622 
 
(0.512) (0.378) (-0.344) (0.753) (0.824) (0.096) 
Constant 22.205 -78.584 -821.515 291.178 513.703 -192.637 
  (0.037) (-0.083) (-0.647) (0.441) (0.480) (-0.130) 
Observations 148,389 148,389 148,389 120,054 120,054 120,054 
Adjusted R2 0.0681 0.109 0.116 0.0717 0.114 0.120 
Year, State, 
Dealer Dummy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the reversed impact of underwriter’s market share growth on underwriter’s future political 
donations. The dependent variable is the cumulative amount of political donations an underwriter makes in 
the future 1 through 3 years. Market Share (Log) is logged underwriter’s market share. Market share growth 
(Log) is the change of logged underwriter’s local market share. The independent variables are defined in 
Appendix D. Year, Underwriter and State/Issuer fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by 
local political subdivisions. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Dependent variables in Models (1) - (3) and Models (4) - (6) are political donation 
amounts for the next 1 through 3 years. The independent variable of interest in the first 
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three columns is logged market share. The coefficients are all positive but Model (3) has 
a significant T value at 10% level. This suggests an underwriter’s current market share is 
positively associated with the bank’s future donation but this rewarding effect is not 
strongly significant. The independent variable interest in Models (4) - (6) is logged 
market share growth. Their T values are not significant, suggesting an underwriter that 
experiences an increase in the market share is not likely to make donations to reward the 
bond issuer. 
Dealer-Issuer History (Past 10) has insignificant T values in Table 9. This 
suggests the past business relation cannot predict future donations. Past Donation 
Dummy has strong and positive T values in predicting underwriters’ future donations. 
This suggests that past contributors are more likely to continue donating in the future. In 
an unreported table, I use a subsample of underwriters with positive market share to 
examine the rewarding pattern and similar results are found as in Table 9.  
Overall, the finding in Table 9 suggests that banks with high market share do not 
reward the bond issuers by making more donations. Banks experiencing an increase in 
their market share do not tend to make more donations in the future either.  
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CHAPTER VI  
CONCLUSION 
A growing body of recent research investigates the incentive and the value of 
corporate political connections. There are two opposite views on such political 
contributing behavior: (1) firms use political donations as a corporate investment in order 
to receive government contracts; (2) firms use political donation as a means to provide 
valuable information to government which could improve the decision-making process. 
This paper uses an original data set on investment banks’ donations over two decades and 
investigates the question: whether political contributing banks obtain more government 
bond business than non-contributing banks.  
First, I focus on the impact of political donations on negotiated deals between 
investment banks and local government issuers. The finding shows political connections 
have a strong impact on the underwriter selection process for negotiated deals. On 
average, making donations to local government officials is associated with 19.6% more 
business after controlling for underwriter’s past relationship with the issuer, underwriter’s 
reputation, location, and local economy factors. The result continues to hold after 
including underwriters’ fixed effects. This finding lends support to the political-
investment hypothesis. It documents a direct cash flow channel through which political 
connections are valuable to underwriting banks.  
The second focus of the paper is the economic implication of political donations 
on bond issuers. Using gross spread as a measure of bond issuance cost, I find that hiring 
a contributing bank as the lead underwriter is associated with 4% higher issuance 
expense, compared with bonds sold by non-contributing banks. This result remains robust 
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after controlling for issuer credit ratings, bond structures, and underwriter characteristics. 
The evidence is inconsistent with the information-sharing hypothesis that believes 
political donations provide valuable information to the issuer official. This economic 
distortion provides evidence on quid pro quo arrangements in the municipal bond market 
where donating investment banks receive higher fees from their connected issuers.  
Using close campaign election results in a RDD analysis, I study the effect on 
underwriting business between banks supporting elected candidates and banks supporting 
unelected candidates. The finding shows donations made to winning candidate are 
positively associated with an investment bank’s underwriting business, compared with 
donating to an unelected candidate. The results lend further support to the value of 
political influence on the underwriter selection process in the municipal bond market.  
In a two-state regression analysis, I use state-level corruption convictions as an 
instrumental variable. The results are robustly consistent with the baseline models. 
Among factors determining an underwriter’s donating choice, I find investment banks 
that have an office in the local area are more likely to make political donations to local 
officials (Butler, Fauver, and Mortal 2009). The finding also shows investment banks are 
more likely to donate money to prospective bond issuers. This is consistent with the 
political-investment hypothesis that suggests donating banks have more incentives to 
connect with issuers with greater business opportunities. I find that banks with good 
reputation are less likely to make donations. This is consistent with Duchin and Sosyura’s 
(2012) finding that firms with good performance are more politically independent 
because their survival is less likely to rely on their political relationship with the 
government. In a difference-in-differences analysis, I compare the political effect 
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between negotiated deals and competitive deals. After controlling for donation’s effect on 
competitive deals, political contributions are strongly associated with more negotiated 
contracts. Using the amount of future donations as dependent variable, I find that 
underwriters’ current relative market share and the growth of their market share are 
positively associated with the amount of donations they are going to make in the next 3 
years. But this predictive effect appears to be statistically insignificant. 
Overall, this paper sheds light on the debate: whether political contributing banks 
are favorably treated in the government bond market? The finding shows that not only 
political contributing underwriters are more likely to be hired in negotiated deals, but 
they are also paid higher fees in the primary bond market. This finding suggests that 
political donations are still valuable to municipal underwriters even after the introduction 
of Rule G-37, a rule intends to cease the business soliciting practice in the municipal 
bond market. While donations to individual candidates are restricted to a great extent, 
donations to political parties still have a strong influence on investment banks’ bond 
business with local officials. More rigorous regulations on such donation channel should 
be considered in order to completely terminate the pay-to-play practice in the municipal 
bond market. 
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APPENDIX A 
A SAMPLE OF FORM G-37 
 
Source: https://emma.msrb.org/MarketActivity/PoliticalContributions.aspx 
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APPENDIX B 
TOP ISSUERS AND CONTRIBUTORS 
Local 
Top Issuers 
Top Connected 
States/Counties/Cities 
Top Connected Political 
Parties/Committees 
Top Underwriting Banks Top Donating Banks 
Local Name 
Issue 
(Billion $) 
Local Name 
Total 
($) 
Local Party 
Total 
($) 
Underwriter 
Issue 
(Billion $) 
Underwriter 
Total 
($) 
State 
NY 359.38 NY 945,467 State Republican Party 1,304,0
85 
J.P. Morgan Securities 391.8 Goldman, Sachs 596,000 
CA 270.92 FL 636,213 State Democratic Party 744,64
9 
Citigroup Global Markets 369.83 William R Hough 385,950 
CT 244.22 IL 574,275 State Republican Committee 637,84
2 
Goldman, Sachs 313.5 Citigroup Global Markets 362,982 
MA 211.06 CA 349,417 State Democratic Committee 459,27
0 
UBS Securities 288.66 Mesirow Financial 297,900 
NJ 129.08 MO 256,175 Public Securities Association 153,31
9 
Merrill Lynch 256.27 Raymond James 280,406 
County 
Nassau (NY) 24.61 New York (NY) 113,000 County Republican Committee 291,11
8 
Citigroup Global Markets 51.14 Goldman, Sachs 101,500 
Harris (TX) 19.14 Bucks (PA) 54,350 County Republican Party 91,928 J.P. Morgan Securities 30.01 First Union Capital Markets 76,030 
Miami-Dade (FL) 15.61 Delaware (PA) 28,463 School District 72,000 UBS Securities 20.45 Janney Montgomery Scott 73,295 
Clark (NY) 12.26 Cook (IL) 27,265 County Democratic Party 66,200 Goldman, Sachs 18.28 Ej De La Rosa 72,000 
Suffolk (NY) 11.3 Burlington (NJ) 23,900 County Democratic Committee 57,115 Lehman Brothers 18.1 Broadpoint Capital 33,630 
City 
New York (NY) 122.01 Philadelphia (PA) 9,000 Local Republican Committee 15,010 J.P. Morgan Securities 86.64 William Blair 9,470 
Chicago (IL) 59.62 New Trier (IL) 6,470 Local Republican Party 10,030 Citigroup Global Markets 77.2 First Union Capital Markets 9,090 
Los Angeles (CA) 35.47 Bridgeport (CT) 5,000 Local Democratic Party 5,800 Goldman, Sachs 62.2 Roosevelt & Cross 5,580 
Houston (TX) 23.69 Easthampton (NY) 5,000 City Democratic Committee 5,280 UBS Securities 47.09 Legg Mason Wood Walker 5,425 
San Antonio (TX) 21.65 Long Beach (NY) 3,830 City Republican Committee 3,550 Merrill Lynch 41.08 Morgan Stanley 5,000 
 This table presents the summary statistics of bond issue, underwriting amount, political donation to local parties for the top five investment banks in states, counties and cities. 
Underwriting amount is the total amount underwritten by the underwriter in each state, county and city. Total donation is the total amount of political donations in each state, county and 
city. Count is the number of political donations in each state, county and city. 
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APPENDIX C 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR BOND ISSUES 
Variable 
Issues with Donations Issues without Donations 
N Mean Std. Min Max N Mean Std. Min Max 
Underwriting Fee 1,915 7.38 4.14 0.38 27.50 17,563 6.87 4.41 0.38 27.50 
Underwriting Fee (Log) 1,915 2.01 0.49 0.32 3.35 17,563 1.92 0.54 0.32 3.35 
Donation Amount ($1,000) 1,915 31.46 52.21 0.03 315.75 17,563 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Dealer-Issuer History (Past10) 1,915 0.96 0.19 0.00 1.00 17,563 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Local Office 1,915 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00 17,563 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Investment Grade 1,915 0.87 0.34 0.00 1.00 17,563 0.88 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Rating Missing 1,915 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 17,563 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Maturity (Log) 1,915 3.12 0.54 0.21 4.61 17,563 3.07 0.63 0.01 4.61 
Coupon (Log) 1,915 1.23 0.85 0.00 2.32 17,563 1.27 0.83 0.00 5.48 
Issue Size (Log) 1,915 17.61 1.57 12.75 21.58 17,563 17.87 1.45 11.57 22.71 
G.O. Bond 1,915 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 17,563 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Lagged Dealer Share (Log) 1,915 1.41 0.90 0.00 2.87 17,563 1.66 0.91 0.00 2.87 
Lagged Local Share (Log) 1,915 0.97 0.53 0.02 1.80 17,563 0.61 0.42 0.00 1.80 
Lagged Dealer-Local Share (Log) 1,915 0.19 0.23 0.00 0.93 17,563 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.87 
Advisor 1,915 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 17,563 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
No. Managers 1,915 2.83 2.85 1.00 36.00 17,563 2.93 2.63 1.00 56.00 
Tax Exempt 1,915 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 17,563 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Insurance 1,915 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 17,563 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Guarantee 1,915 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 17,563 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 
Letter Credit 1,915 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 17,563 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
State GDP (Log) 1,915 12.99 0.92 10.00 14.61 17,563 12.47 1.07 9.52 14.61 
Local Income (Log) 1,915 10.43 0.22 9.88 11.05 17,563 10.46 0.25 9.72 11.18 
Local Employment (Log) 1,915 15.61 0.79 12.83 16.88 17,563 14.89 1.08 11.57 16.88 
Local Population (Log) 1,915 16.18 0.82 13.24 17.46 17,563 15.41 1.13 11.80 17.46 
Local Establishment (Log) 1,915 12.62 0.83 9.82 14.14 17,563 11.88 1.10 7.89 14.14 
State Interest Tax 1,915 5.19 1.87 0.00 10.47 17,563 4.74 2.26 0.00 11.98 
Tax Outside State 1,915 0.95 0.22 0.00 1.00 17,563 0.84 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Time Trend 1,915 9.45 4.51 1.00 20.00 17,563 11.48 5.48 1.00 20.00 
This table presents the summary statistics for the group of observations with political donations to local parties, political  donations 
to campaign candidates, and observations with no donations in the most recent five years [t-4, t]. Each bond issue identifies an 
observation. Columns 2-6 include observations with political donations to local parties in the recent five years. Columns 7-11 
include observations with no donations in the recent five years. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix D. 
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APPENDIX D 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variables Definition 
Political Donation Dummy Political payment to local political parties [t-4, t]. 
Donation Amount ($) Total payment amount over the recent 5 years [t-4, t]. 
Hire Equals 1 if an investment bank is hired. 0 otherwise. 
Market Share (Log) Investment bank's market share over local total issue amount in percentage. 
Market Share Growth First order difference of Market Share [t-1, t]. 
Underwriting Fee Underwriter's discount per $1,000 bond. (Logged) 
Local Office Equals 1 if the underwriter has an office in the issuer's state. 0 otherwise. 
Dealer-Issuer History (Past10) Equals 1 if the underwriter and the issuer have business in the past 10 years. 0 otherwise. 
Donation with History (Past10) Interaction of Political Donation Dummy and Dealer-Issuer History (Past10). 
Past Donation  [t-4, t] Equals 1 if the underwriter has made a donation in the recent 5 years [t-4, t]. 
Investment Grade Equals 1 if the bond has a investment grade rating. 0 otherwise. 
No Ratings Equals 1 if the bond has no ratings. 0 otherwise. 
Coupon (Log) Logged bond coupon. 
Maturity (Log) Logged years to maturity. 
Issue Size (Log) Logged offering amount per bond issue. 
Lagged Local Share (Log) Local issue amount over the nation's total issue amount over the past 3 years. 
Lagged Dealer Share (Log) An underwriter’s business over the nation's total issue amount over the past 3 years. 
Lagged Dealer-Local Share (Log) An underwriter's local market share over the local issue amount over the past 3 years. 
General Obligation (G.O) Equals 1 if the bond is a general obligation bond. 0 otherwise. 
Negotiated Dummy Equals 1 if the bond issue is a negotiated deal. 0 otherwise. 
Negotiated-Donation Interaction of Negotiated Dummy and Political Donation Dummy. 
Insured Bond Equals 1 if the bond is insured. 0 otherwise. 
Enhancement Equals 1 if the bond has credit enhancement. 0 otherwise. 
Guaranteed Equals if the bond has a guarantee provision. 0 otherwise. 
Letter Credit Equals 1 if the bond has a credit letter. 0 otherwise. 
Advisor Equals 1 if an advisor is present in a bond issue. 0 otherwise. 
No. Managers The number managers for a bond issue. 
State Tax Exempt Equals 1 if the bond is state tax exempt. 
State Interest Tax State interest tax. 
Tax Outside State Equals 1 if a state taxes investors from a different state. 
GDP (Log) Logged Gross Domestic Product in a state. 
Income (Log) Logged income in a state (county). 
Establishment (Log) Logged number of business establishments in a state (county). 
Employment (Log) Logged employment in a state (county). 
Population (Log) Logged state (county) population. 
Public Company Equals 1 if the bank is a public company. 0 otherwise. 
Dealer Age (Log) Logged investment bank's age. 
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Same Party Connection Equals 1 if the dealer supports the incumbent party. 0 otherwise. 
Opposite Party Connection Equals 1 if the dealer supports the party that is not in office. 0 otherwise. 
Won Equals 1 if the supporting candidate is elected. 0 otherwise. 
Vote Share The candidate's vote share minus 50%. 
Won-Vote Share Interaction of Won and Vote Share. 
Donated Equals 1 if the dealer supports only on party. 
Donated-Won Interaction of Donated and Won. 
Donated Vote Share Interaction of Donated and Vote Share. 
Donated-Won-Vote Share Interaction of Donated, Won and Vote Share. 
Corruption [t-3, t-1] (K) Logged convictions per million populations for a state. 
Predicted Donation Predicted probability of making a donation during the recent 5 years [t-4, t]. 
Time Trend Equals 1 to 20 for year 1994 to year 2013. 
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APPENDIX E 
RULE G-37 
The rule includes four general parts: (1) the business prohibition provision; (2) the 
solicitation restriction; (3) the indirect clause provision; and (4) the disclosure and record 
keeping requirements23.  
Practically, the Rule G-37 prevents underwriters from doing business with a municipal 
entity within two years after a contribution is made to an official24 and requires underwriters to 
disclose both contributions to the campaign candidates and payments to the local political 
parties. Even though the rule restricts the pay-to-play practice to some extent25, investment banks 
could still find grey areas to make contributions to individual candidates through political parties 
without being banned from bond businesses. The two-year business ban only regulates 
contributions used for specific campaign candidates. In other words, underwriters can still 
contribute to political parties, without triggering the prohibition, as long as the political parties 
do not state that they will give the money to a specific candidate.26 For instance, an investment 
bank will be banned from doing business with the issuer if the bank makes a contribution of 
$10,000 to a republican candidate for the governor campaign. But the investment bank can 
circumvent the rule by giving $10,000 to the state’s republican party. This “loophole” indirectly 
permits underwriters to build political connections with government officials so that they can 
continue the pay-to-play practice.  
                                                             
23 See Original Rule G-37. http://www.msrb.org/Rules-and-Interpretations/MSRB-Rules/General/Rule-G-37.aspx 
24 The exemption would only be granted in limited circumstances such as a contribution not exceeding the de 
minimis limit of $250 per election when the contributor is entitled to vote for the official. 
25 Butler, Fauver, and Mortal (2009) compare the underwriting fees before and after the adoption of the Rule G-37 
and find that investment-banking fees for negotiated deals significantly dropped after 1994. 
26 The Rule G-37 states underwriters should inquire of the political party how the donation would be used. 
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APPENDIX F 
VIOLATION CASES 
A Case of Business Prohibition 
On March 18, 1996, a municipal finance employee of Merrill Lynch made a $1,000 
donation to Lt. Governor Candidate of Indiana (Frank O’Brannon). This donation caused a two-
year ban on the companies’ muni business with the state of Indiana. The prohibition forced the 
firm to withdraw as co-underwriter of a $35 million muni business in April by the Indiana 
Housing Finance Authority27. 
A Case of G-37 Violation 
A former Southwest Securities Inc. municipal finance employee, Mr. Kendrick, 
contributed $1,625 to Timothy Cahill, the treasurer of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
during 2003-2008. Timothy is responsible for selecting dealers for municipal bond business for 
the state. According to Rule G-37, any contribution exceeding $250 would trigger a two-year ban 
on the bank’s muni business with the issuer.  
Within two years after the contribution, Southwest Securities Inc., with the knowledge of 
the political contribution, participated as co-manager for 19 negotiated underwritings by the 
issuer. The total underwriting amount is approximate $14 billion. This breached Section 15B-(c)-
(1) of the Exchange Act, MSRB Rule G-37 (b) and MSRB Rule G-37 (c). Kendrick had to pay 
$10,000 fine to settle the action. 
  
                                                             
27 Merrill Executive’s Political Donation in Indiana Curbs Firm’s Business There, the Wall Street Journal, May 24, 
1996, A4. 
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